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Abstract. The multifaceted interplay of economic and political factors in the process of 
euro adoption suggests the opportunity to take a political economy perspective on this 
complex issue. In this sense, a number of key political-economy related issues can be 
distilled in relation to the process of euro adoption, which will structure the following 
analysis. What are the key national winners and losers of this possible event? What role 
has interest groups pressure played in this process? Under what circumstances may 
bureaucracies such as the central bank body of experts act as a deterrent for the political 
end that is the single currency adoption? How are internationally exposed companies 
expected to behave and to promote their interests in relation to this event? What is the 
relative importance of the internal politics dynamic for euro adoption? We rely on process 
tracing to approach these questions for the Romanian case. Policy documents, newspaper 
articles, academic articles, economic indicators, and elite interviews are used to create an 
analytical narrative based both on a one-point-in-time description of the situation and on 
a timeline that lists the sequence of some relevant events. We argue that a specific 
combination of economic and political factors led to the failed euro adoption in Romania. 
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Introduction and literature review 
 
The process of monetary unification in the EU – i.e., the establishment of a single 
currency for all members of the EU – has been conceptualized, discussed and promoted 
mainly in economic terms. The economics of monetary unification analyze the (mainly 
economic) costs and benefits that member states draw from agreeing to replace multiple 
national currencies with a single currency. On practical grounds, a policy-related issue 
– the necessity to replace the abandoned exchange rate as a policy tool in the hands of 
national governments – has been usually stressed. The academic and popular debates 
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about the practicability of fiscal policy instruments gained momentum, as did the 
discussions about the effects that the availability of these economic policy instruments 
may have on national sovereignty. However, the political factor has been habitually put 
aside as the benevolent despot view of the government was tacitly embraced with 
regard to the creation of the EMU. Political processes such as treaty negotiations, 
parliamentary ratifications, and popular referenda have been studied in relative 
disconnection from the economic arguments put forward in favor of this monetary 
arrangement. 
 
Similarly, the process of euro adoption by countries that entered the EU later is usually 
described as being driven by economic factors. The process of nominal and real 
convergence with older members has been carefully analyzed. The implicit hypothesis 
here is that the national governments of outsiders will choose the optimum timing for 
the euro adoption, constrained only by a more or less Eurosceptic internal public. Much 
less weight has been put on the complex interaction of economic and political 
dimensions during preparations for euro adoption, such as the political interests of 
national governments and their relation with major internal economic players. 
 
Theories inspired by the analysis of the OCAs emphasize the best conditions for a 
country to abandon an autonomous monetary policy (Mundell, 1961; Frankel & Rose, 
1998). A floating exchange rate system may successfully be abandoned if the economy 
has certain mechanisms able to act as built-in adjustment tools, such as internationally 
flexible and mobile capital and labor markets. In this case, the national economies of a 
monetary bloc may draw advantages from having a single currency managed by a 
transnational authority rather than multiple national currencies issued by national 
monetary authorities. 
 
The rigid theoretical construction of currency areas is unsuited to explain the monetary 
unification in the EU (Frieden, 2002). The EU is unlikely to meet all the conditions 
required for an OCA, as labor mobility and correlation among exogenous shocks in 
various member states are still low. Even the initial, eleven-country Eurozone may have 
not been the ideal area to form a monetary union. Similarly, it can be argued that the 
present-day drive for the enlargement of the Eurozone is far from being an economically 
motivated process. Therefore, the ongoing political interest in the move towards 
monetary unification must be explained on different grounds. 
 
One way to extend the narrow economic view on European monetary integration is to 
look at the factors that influence the behavior of politicians who ultimately decide on a 
country’s monetary institutions. Frieden (1998, p.26) argues that three principal factors 
contributed to the political attractiveness of the euro, given that a precise calculation of 
economic costs and benefit is impossible: the quest for anti-inflationary credibility, the 
links between the single currency and the European integration, and the support from 
the powerful business interests. Germany has been a champion of low inflation and 
monetary soundness and the countries with a weaker monetary record have tried to 
reinforce perceptions by committing to the rules of the single currency area. Fearing of 
becoming second-rate countries, the national political elites of the outsiders would face 
strong incentives to participating in the monetary unification. Similarly, large pan-
European corporations would be attracted to the exchange rate stability and would 
pressure national government to become part of the euro bloc. Moreover, there are 
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winners and losers of the European monetary integration and identifying these two 
groups may shed light on the forces at play in this process. 
 
The academic literature dedicated to the Romanian case for euro adoption is fairly 
extensive. Unsurprisingly, the perspective taken in this literature is strictly economic– 
i.e., the one that deals with the conditions required for common currency areas to be 
optimal. Șimandan, Leuștean and Dobrescu (2017) synthesize this far-reaching body of 
literature and classify the competing frameworks used to analyze the adoption of the 
euro into the economic framework and the institutional-political framework. As these 
authors argue at length, the degree of fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria is a preferred 
topic among academics that deal with this subject. What these studies have in common 
is their conclusion that meeting the nominal convergence criteria is not enough for a 
successful euro adoption (Triandafil, 2011), a view that is also common in the popular 
press and political communication. The political economy perspective has not been 
applied with reference to the euro adoption in Romania – hence the novelty of the 
present study. However, unexpectedly to a certain degree, a few practitioners 
complement their public presentations on the matter with political economy 
considerations (e.g., Voinea, 2017). A surprising aspect that we came across during 
interviews was the prevalence of political economy and political considerations that 




The framework for analysis, research questions, and methodology 
 
Once the limits of the strictly economic perspective have been acknowledged, the 
process of euro adoption in the NMSs has been analyzed by studying the economic and 
political institutions and other features of the domestic environment in which this 
enterprise occurs (Dandashly & Verdun, 2015, 2018; Johnson, 2006, 2008). Tools 
derived from the political economy and comparative politics traditions have been 
employed to explain the diverse strategies that these countries enacted. 
 
A first theoretical base for these applied studies is found in the literature dedicated to 
the political economy of monetary institutions, which analyzes the monetary 
arrangements that individual countries choose in relation to certain political 
institutions. Given the time inconsistency and the inflationary bias of monetary 
policymakers, central bank independence and a predictable exchange rate regime (i.e., 
fixed exchange rates) evolved to insulate monetary issues from political pressures 
(Bernhard, Broz, & Clark, 2002). At the international level, strategic interactions among 
governments, compelled by national concerns and constrained by the international 
environment shape the international monetary system (Broz & Frieden, 2001). 
However, both the perspective that emphasizes the national preference formation for a 
certain monetary arrangement and the view that focuses on strategic interactions 
among national governments in international monetary matters fall short in explaining 
the dynamics of the EMU. The process of monetary unification in Europe has been an 
unprecedented endeavor that dramatically transformed economic policy and politics in 
Europe. Moreover, the sundry strategies of NMSs towards euro adoption must be 
explained taking into account some elements of their internal political dynamic. 
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Writing at a time when the process of monetary unification was in its early stages, 
Feldstein (1997) stresses the importance of political motivations behind this move, in 
the light of his assessment that the EMU had a negative net economic effect. The desire 
to promote cooperation and peace while closely guarding national interests, the 
prospects of increased cross-border bureaucracy, the willingness of the European 
political elite to bypass popular preferences related to a single currency have all been 
extra-economic catalysts for the European monetary unification process. Moving from 
political sources to political effects of monetary integration, Feldstein argues that if 
cyclical conditions differ among the member states, the uniform monetary and fiscal 
policies that a monetary union requires will likely result in political conflict rather than 
the desired political cooperation. Moreover, the economic consequences may well be 
contrary to those expected, since an “artificially contrived” monetary unification is 
expected to reduce the volume of trade among member states and to increase 
unemployment (Feldstein, 1992). Friedman’s economic and political diagnosis is 
similar, given that the common market is not integrated well enough in terms of the 
freedom of circulation of goods and capital (Friedman, 1997). 
 
The real factors of the EU’s currency policy (as opposed to the monetary factors) have 
been found to be significant, as exporters and cross-border investors tend to favor a 
stable exchange rate. On the political economy of EMU, Eichengreen and Frieden (1993) 
are among the first to study the process of monetary unification in the EU 
simultaneously from an economic and a political perspective. The authors show that 
EMU is the outcome of a political enterprise and put forward three sets of political 
considerations as a point of departure in explaining the dynamics of EMU: interstate 
bargaining, issue linkage, and domestic distributional factors. The interests that the 
large economic sectors have in the monetary unification process have also been studied 
(Frieden, 2002). 
 
Bagus (2010) analyzes the quintessential political nature of the euro. He points out that 
the euro shares the same key feature with the rest of today’s currencies: it is fiat money. 
A governmental agency – i.e., the European Central Bank – is entrusted with the power 
and responsibility to issue the euro for the benefit of the European state. From this 
perspective, replacing multiple national fiat currencies with one European fiat currency 
bears no important economic advantages. In fact, the opposite case seems to be 
unfolding, leading to the author’s conclusion that the EMU is a self-destroying, conflict 
aggregating system since there is no externally enforced mechanism to restrict the 
money production and the cross-border wealth transfers that it requires.  
 
The multifaceted interplay of economic and political factors suggests the opportunity to 
take a political economy perspective on this complex issue. In this sense, a number of 
key political-economy related issues can be distilled in relation to the process of euro 
adoption, which will structure the following analysis. What are the key national winners 
and losers of this possible event? What role has interest groups pressure played in this 
process? Under what circumstances may bureaucracies such as the central bank body of 
experts act as a deterrent for the political end that is the single currency adoption? How 
are internationally exposed companies expected to behave and to promote their 
interests in relation to this event? How did they in fact behave? What is the relative 
importance of the internal politics dynamic for euro adoption? 
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Our methodological approach relies on process tracing to look into these issues for the 
Romanian case. Policy documents, newspaper articles, academic articles, economic 
indicators and elite interviews with stakeholders in the euro adoption process are used 
to create an analytical narrative based both on a one-point-in-time description of the 
situation and on a timeline that lists the sequence of some relevant events. We 
conducted face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with eight academics and officials 
from the Ministry of Finance and the central bank between June and November 2018. 
The descriptive power of process tracing is completed by the analysis of some causal 
inferences that this technique enables (Collier, 2011). Given the fact that the Romanian 
authorities have only recently made public a calendar for adoption, the relative 
importance of the aforementioned factors for this failure is analyzed. Since process 
tracing is particularly suited for gaining insight into causal mechanisms, this 
methodology is used for the study of the hypothesis that a particular combination of the 
variables advanced above concurred to the failed adoption of the euro by Romania. 
 
This article seeks to study the Romanian case of Eurozone accession. We classify the 
factors for euro adoption into three categories. The economic factors include those 
criteria derived from the OCA theory, such as the economic structure and trade relation, 
labor market flexibility and the business cycle synchronization. The political economy 
factors deal with the actions of national and supranational bodies, such as the 
convergence criteria negotiated during the Maastricht process, the later addition of real 
convergence criteria, the exchange rate regime, interest group pressure, and the 
symbolic factor. The third group has to do with internal political factors, such as the 
president, political parties and their relation with the central bank. The following section 
focuses on the analysis of some of these factors, while the third section concludes. 
 
 
Money, politics, and policies. The political economy of euro adoption in Romania 
 
Thus far, adopting the euro has proven to be a bumpy road for Romanian policy makers. 
A number of targets has been put forward and later abandoned as unrealistic (Table 1). 
The declarative support for euro adoption has been a common feature among all post-
accession governments, an enthusiasm that was only marginally deterred by the 
sovereign debt crisis. However, only recently Romanian politicians agreed to an 
adoption calendar.  
 
Table 1. Euro adoption targets, Romania 
(authors’ own compilation) 
Target date Announced Source Abandoned 
2014 2007 2006 – 2009 Convergence Program 2011 
2015 2010 2011 – 2014 Convergence Program 2012 
2019 2014 Political declaration at the ECOFIN meeting 2016 
2024 2018 Decision at the PSD congress ongoing 
 
Interest group pressures: an apparent lack of interest 
 
What role have interest group pressures played in the ongoing process of euro adoption 
in Romania? What groups can be identified that pushed for a rapid switch to the euro? 
First observation on this matter is that in general monetary policy is an area relatively 
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isolated from interest group pressures. The lobbying groups have no means to exclude 
others from enjoying the benefits nor can they find an effective way to share the costs. 
Therefore, incentives to engage in this type of lobbying activity are weak (Broz & 
Frieden, 2001), at least compared to those situations in which the lobbying groups are 
able to exclude others from benefiting from the special treatment, such as the case of the 
trade policy. However, the lobbying activity of some groups has been identified and 
studied in relation to euro adoption in NMSs. Haughton (2010) and Dandashly and 
Verdun (2015) study the Slovak case, where the foreign business lobby, especially the 
automotive industry pushed hard in favor of euro adoption.  
 
Like Slovakia, Romania too benefitted from an increased inflow of FDI, with the 
automotive industry being one of the main beneficiaries. As one of the key growth 
drivers for the economy, the local auto industry accounted for 47% of the country’s 
exports in 2016, with Dacia (part of the Renault group), Ford and Volkswagen being the 
main car manufacturers (Romania Insider, 2017). However, the lobbying activity of this 
foreign-dominated industry appears to be quasi absent (interview with BNR official, 
June 2018). 
 
Money as a symbolic factor: a case of monetary realism 
 
Identities, ideas and the symbolic value that people attach to their national currency are 
important factors that influence popular attitudes towards euro adoption. The different 
degree of attachment that people have towards national currency has been studied as 
an explanatory variable for the diverse speeds and strategies of euro adoption in the 
NMSs (Dandashly & Verdun, 2015). 
 
How much does the symbolic factor explain the Romanian strategy of euro adoption? 
First, trying to assess the degree of symbolic value that Romanians attach to the leu, one 
should look at the polls that address this specific problem in relation to euro adoption. 
The Flash Barometer results for 2018 reveal that in Romania a slight majority of the 
population (47% vs. 44%) disagree that adopting the euro will mean that their country 
will lose a part of its identity. The trend, however, is descendant, (with fewer Romanian 
disagreeing with the idea of a lost identity due to euro adoption) after reaching a 
maximum in May 2010 – 66% (EC, 2018). Second, the quality of the national currency 
may be taken as a proxy for the degree of attachment felt by the people. Romania has 
seen one of the highest inflation among the countries in the region in the first decade of 
transition. The inflation rate reached 295.5% in 1993, fell in 1995 to 27.8%, only to 
increase in 1997 to 151.4%, staying at high levels until the late 2000s. As a result, the 
degree of currency substitution has been among the highest in the region: in 2001, 
42.8% of the M2 money supply was comprised of deposits in foreign currencies. 
 
In sum, the Romanian public does not seem to see many advantages in using the national 
currency and turns to the single currency to save and to make current transactions, a 
fact confirmed by the high percentage of the public that has used the euro within their 
country (around eight out of ten of the group of respondents who have already used 
euro banknotes or coins have done so in Romania or both in Romania and abroad) (EC, 
2018). 
 
To conclude, it is safe to assume that the majority of the Romanian public tends to think 
of their national currency mainly in pragmatic terms and does not attribute great 
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symbolic value to the leu. Therefore, the symbolic factor has not been an impediment 
for euro adoption in Romania. 
 
We shall now analyze the internal politics dimension of euro adoption in Romania 
following the structure of factors of influence used by Dandashly & Verdun (2018) to 
examine the cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In this view, the first set 
of factors includes electoral cycles and the role of the elites such as the presidency and 
political leadership along with the constitutional and legal constraints that they face, 
seeking to assess the degree of influence that these factors have on the euro adoption 
process. The second set of factors has to do with the central bank independence to assess 
how the preferences of the central bank elite affect the process. The last set deals with 
public opinion as we try to evaluate how the Romanian electorate may have influenced 
the monetary choice of the government. 
 
Electoral cycles and the role of the elites: the declarative political support for the 
euro 
 
In an unprecedented collaborative political effort, all major Romanian parties supported 
the country’s accession to NATO and the EU. To this day, Romania’s membership of the 
EU has remained virtually undisputed by major political players. Similarly, the 
perspective to adopt the single currency seems to have benefitted from across-the-
board political support. However, given that Romania has not yet adopted the euro and 
a clear-cut political decision has only recently been taken, this statement needs 
clarification. 
 
Indeed, on the one hand, the declarative support for an early euro adoption has been 
abundant among key political figures. Initially, the Romanian government had planned 
to adopt the euro in 2014, Prime Minister Emil Boc being so optimistic as to declare that 
even this date should be brought forward, stating that the government was working at 
a strategy for early adoption (Mediafax, 2009). However, this plan never came to 
fruition, 2014, 2015 and 2019 have all been abandoned as target dates. The first 
Convergence Program issued by the government in January 2007 contained a 
commitment to enter the ERM II in 2012, while through the 2014 – 2017 Convergence 
Program the authorities committed to adopting the euro in January 2019. The rest of the 
programs contained no clear date for adoption, the government declaring in general 
terms its intentions to adopt the euro at some point in the future. The abandonment of 
the target was usually disclosed in public statements through the voice of the prime 
minister (or the finance minister), who emphasized the still unsatisfactory “readiness of 
the economy” as a key factor for the missed target (e.g., Gheorghe, 2017). 
 
However, on the other hand, a clear timetable for euro adoption has only recently been 
made public. Coupled with the reserved attitude of the BNR with regard to early euro 
adoption, this speaks to the duplicitous stance of the political elite towards euro 
adoption. Offering a rationale for euro adoption, the Romanian political discourse began 
to included elements specific to EU politics, such as the importance for Romania “to join 
the [Eurozone] club” or “to have a seat at the decision table” (Șimandan, Leuștean, & 
Dobrescu, 2017). 
 
The 2014 and 2019 European Parliament election campaigns have constituted good 
opportunities for Romanian political parties to declare their adherence to European 
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values. Although the campaign themes were concerned mainly with internal politics, all 
major parties regarded the accession to the Eurozone as a prime political objective 
(Europuls, 2019).  
 
In March 2018, the ruling PSD voted at an extraordinary congress to back a 2024 target 
date for joining the Eurozone (Marinas, 2018). This political move is worth mentioning 
because it is for the first time that a party in power commits to a firm target date for 
adoption, while all the other targets set and later dropped originated in the executive 
branch. As a result of this decision, a national commission in charge of drafting the 
timetable for adoption was set up and began its activity. In an attempt to build a large 
national consensus, the commission is comprised of representatives of various 
academic, political, governmental and civil society organizations. The commission 
presented its report to the public in April 2019 (National Commission for the 
Development of the National Plan to Adopt the Euro Currency, 2018). In this document, 
five strategic objectives are stated, which are meant to increase the real and structural 
convergence with the Eurozone. Perhaps unsurprisingly, absent from the document is a 
clear target date, which is left to political decision. Daniel Dăianu, a prominent member 
of the commission and a member of the BNR board, recommended the year 2026 as the 
horizon for adoption so as to avoid “a too tight calendar” (Actmedia, 2018).  
 
The optimistic scenario to adopt the euro in 2024 has little credibility given that 
Romania’s economic conditions deteriorated in 2018 to the point that only one (i.e., the 
public debt) of the four nominal convergence criteria were met (EC, 2018). Moreover, 
the recent expansionary fiscal policy implemented by the PSD government is 
incompatible with such an ambitious timetable for Eurozone accession. 
 
As for the role of the presidency, according to the Romanian constitution, any law must 
be promulgated by the president, who is able to send bills back to the parliament for 
reexamination or to challenge them to the constitutional court. However, the president 
may do so only ones since promulgating a reexamined bill is compulsory. Therefore, the 
president has no veto power in the Romanian constitutional architecture. In addition, 
the president has no specific economic role. In practice, the president may try to use 
public communication to influence the political agenda, a strategy brought into play by 
president Traian Băsescu during his ten-year office holding. 
 
Since 2004, both president Traian Băsescu and president Klaus Iohannis publicly 
expressed their support for the adoption of the single currency. President Băsescu has 
been an enthusiast supporter both of the EU integration and of the Eurozone adherence 
throughout his presidency. “I believe it should be firmly stated in our documents a target 
date, and an optimum time can’t be other than 2017”, he stated in an interview in 2013 
(Caleaeuropeana, 2013). In 2011, Băsescu insisted that Romania was still committed to 
joining the common currency area by 2015 despite the economic turmoil in the 
Eurozone. “Don’t laugh”, he said speaking in Berlin after a meeting with German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, “We want to join the Eurozone in 2015 if all the preconditions 
are satisfied” (Journal.ie, 2011). Similarly, President Iohannis took every opportunity to 
affirm the country’s attachment to all European values, including the single currency 
project. In his view, joining the Eurozone should become a “country project”, a condition 
for achieving this goal, however, being a broad political consensus (Chiriac, 2015). 
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Related to the broader legal context for euro adoption, it is safe to assume that the 
Romanian Constitution does not amount to an impediment for euro adoption. In fact, the 
opposite seems to be the case, since Article 137 of the Constitution was amended in 2003 
to state, “The national currency is the leu, with its subdivision, the ban. Under the terms 
of Romania's accession to the European Union, national currency circulation and 
replacement by that of the European Union may be acknowledged by an organic law” 
(Constitution of Romania, 1991). 
 
To summarize, we advance the idea that the political support for euro adoption has been 
a common feature of all the post-accession governments. However, the lack of concrete 
steps towards euro adoption coupled with the absence of a commitment to a calendar 
for adoption led us to assume that this political support has been mainly declarative. 
 
The role of the central bank: a cautious stance 
 
In post-communist Romania, the central bank gained relative independence in 1991 as 
a result of the adoption of the Law regarding the Statute of the BNR (no. 34/1991). The 
degree of independence further increased with the adoption of a new law (no. 
314/2004) which defines the central bank as an independent public institution. The 
members of the board, including the governor, are appointed by the parliament on the 
proposal of the competent standing committees for a five-year term, with the possibility 
of unlimited renewals. The parliament may revoke the members of the board only if 
found guilty of serious misconduct. As for the goal independence, the primary objective 
of the BNR set by law is to maintain price stability. In 2005, the BNR assumed a direct 
inflation-targeting framework in an attempt to curb the high inflation characteristic to 
the first decade of transition in Romania. The central bank has a high degree of freedom 
to establish the targeted inflation rate. 
 
In its Converge reports, the EC assessed the independence of the BNR as insufficient, 
pointing to a number of imperfections and incompatibilities with EU norms (EC, 2018, 
pp.105-106). The legal right of the Finance Minister (or one of the State Secretaries in 
the Ministry of Finance) to participate in the meetings of the board (without voting 
rights) may put these politicians in a position to influence the central bank’s decisions 
and is incompatible with the provisions of Article 130 of the TFEU. Moreover, according 
to the BNR Law, the Court of Auditors is empowered to control the establishment, 
management and use of the public sector’s financial resources (BNR included) and to 
audit the performance in the management of the funds of the BNR. This provision is 
deemed as an imperfection since the relation with independent external auditors is not 
clarified. In addition, the legal provision that the BNR must transfer to the state budget 
80% of net revenues on a monthly basis may affect its financial independence. Thus far, 
the EC’s recommendations have not been translated into legislative initiatives although 
they have been routinely discussed in the popular press. 
 
Overall, the degree of independence of the central bank can be said to have increased 
steadily, with a limited number of points remaining to be addressed through the political 
process. The members of the board are politically appointed, with the major parties 
cooperating in passing the appointments. A large majority of parliamentarians 
reappointed Governor Mugur Isărescu in 2014 for his fifth term in office, while vice-
governor positions were filled by high-profile politicians, both from parties in power 
and in opposition (Business Review, 2014). 
278 | Radu ȘIMANDAN, Beatrice LEUȘTEAN, Răzvan DOBRESCU 
Not Only Economics: The Political Economy of Euro Adoption in Romania 
Across time, the BNR has had a cautious approach towards euro adoption. Officials from 
the central bank have routinely emphasized the role of the real economy and political 
factors in addition to monetary factors for successful euro adoption. Governor Isărescu 
has long championed putting the process of euro adoption in the framework of the real 
convergence set of arguments (Isărescu, 2007, 2008, 2013, 2015). Unlike nominal 
convergence, which enjoys a clear-cut legal definition, real convergence lacks 
definitional precision. Among the criteria used to assess real convergence, per capita 
GDP has been analyzed in many documents originating from the BNR. The crucial 
contribution of the fiscal policy to meeting the criteria for euro adoption has been 
habitually emphasized (e.g., Isărescu, 2008). 
 
In Romanian context, a number of indicators have been put forward to assess the degree 
of the economy’s real convergence, such as the openness of the economy, the share of 
the EU in foreign trade, the productive structure of the economy, and the per capita GDP 
(Isărescu, 2007). Considered the most important criterion to assess the real 
convergence, this last indicator has been analyzed in many documents originating from 
the BNR. From this viewpoint, Isărescu (2007) advances a discouraging 60-year horizon 
for the Romanian economy to catch up with the EU average, given a 4 pp growth 
differential. The crucial contribution of the fiscal policy to meeting the criteria for euro 
adoption has been habitually emphasized (e.g., Isărescu, 2008, p.3). 
 
In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis, Isărescu (2013) argues that putting off euro 
adoption, at least temporarily, seems justified. Trying to rationalize this wait-and-see 
attitude of the BNR, he offers the following arguments: the single currency has gradually 
lost its appeal; the advantages of the euro have become less noticeable, while the 
disadvantages more clear; the reduction in financing costs (as a result of decreased 
interest rates brought about by the single currency) may no longer be considered a 
clear-cut benefit; the sluggish economic growth in the euro area makes further 
commercial integration less appealing (pp.11-15). Therefore, a “sustainable” meeting of 
the Maastricht criteria is needed (p.19). Moreover, the recent experience is depicted in 
BNR’s documents as unfriendly to euro adoption, substantially “altering the approach to 
euro adoption” as policymakers enjoy “limited room for maneuver due to past pro-
cyclical behavior” (Isărescu, 2015, pp.13,15).  
 
Deputy Governor Florin Georgescu has also laid emphasis on real convergence criteria, 
arguing that in an unreformed environment for doing business, the adoption of the euro 
would make things worse (Georgescu, 2017). Deputy Governor Liviu Voinea has put 
forward a more optimistic view, contending that adopting the euro may be a catalyst for 
structural reforms that Romania needs and pointing to the opportunity cost for 
postponing the adoption in the shape of increased economic discrepancies and lack of 
participation in the EU’s decision-making process (Voinea, 2017). However, on practical 
grounds, his optimism seems to fade since the decision to initiate the switch to the euro 
must be based on a large (perhaps unrealistic) political and popular support (Voinea, 
2017). 
 
In sum, we hypothesize that the cautious stance of the BNR – grounded in the slow 
advance of the real convergence – is a key variable to explain the sluggish move towards 
the single currency in Romania. 
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The public opinion: an unfulfilled enthusiasm 
 
The public opinion factor may be taken as a proxy for the voice of the electorate that 
may influence the entire political process (Dandashly & Verdun, 2016, p.6). Romanians 
have constantly been among the most enthusiastic supporters of the single currency. As 
shown in Table 2, the most recent data show that 69% of the Romanian population is in 
favor of euro adoption (the highest share, as in the previous year), compared with 27% 
that is against. The favorable opinion to euro adoption peaked in 2014, with 74% of 
respondents backing up euro adoption (with only 24% being against). The effect of the 
financial crisis on the positive perceptions of the euro has been modest: 62% of the 
population was favorable to the euro in 2008, declining only to 59%, 55% and 51% in 
2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively, gradually increasing afterward. The proportion of 
respondents who think that the country is ready for the euro is also among the highest 
in the EU (26%), second only to Sweden (27%). Moreover, the share of the population 
who believes that the consequences of euro introduction would be positive considerably 
outweighs those with negative opinions (54% versus 40%). However, the proportion of 
those who want euro adoption to be as late as possible is 28%, steadily increasing from 
17% in 2010 (and 12% in 2008). 
 
Table 2. The Evolution of Public Opinion Regarding the Euro, Romania, 2010–2018 
(%) (European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer,  
various reports from 2011 to 2018) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
In favor of 
introducing the euro* 
55 51 64 67 74 68 64 64 69 
Against introducing 
the euro** 
28 29 30 28 24 26 33 30 27 
Want euro accession 
as late as possible 
17 21 27 29 24 22 32 32 28 
Want euro accession 
as soon as possible 
43 38 36 36 44 40 37 37 34 
Well informed about 
the euro 
45 41 34 37 36 41 40 41 46 
Not well informed 
about the euro 
54 57 65 62 63 58 59 58 52 
Think the euro will 
have positive 
consequences for the 
country 
57 54 49 51 57 54 51 49 54 
Think the euro will 
have negative 
consequences for the 
country 
26 30 44 42 37 39 44 43 40 
*For the years 2010 and 2011, data refer to respondents’ personal satisfaction with euro adoption. 
**For the years 2010 and 2011, data refer to respondents’ personal dissatisfaction with euro 
adoption. 
 
Several factors may help explain the constant support for the single currency, 
notwithstanding the euro crisis. Firstly, given the constantly high rate of inflation during 
the 1990s and the 2000s, which resulted in a soaring degree of currency substitution, 
Romanians are not particularly attached to the national currency. Secondly, unlike other 
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countries outside of the Eurozone, Romania did not see the protective qualities of a 
flexible exchange rate regime. Although the real exchange rate of the leu depreciated by 
19% between 2007 and 2009, the real GDP dropped by 7.1% in 2009. Romanians could 
learn that having an internally managed currency is not an effective shield against 
external economic shocks. Thirdly, given the countless corruption scandals that the 
public has witnessed since the mid-2000s and the ensuing general disappointment with 
the internal political class, it is not hazardous to assume that Romanians – laymen and 
elite alike – would see with good eyes the introduction of an externally managed 
currency, out of reach of national politicians. 
 
For these reasons, we theorize that the public opinion favorable to euro adoption has 
not been translated into an effective pressure on politicians to speed up the euro area 
accession. The freedom to use the euro for price quotations, savings, and borrowing, 
coupled with the fact that euro adoption has not been a salient issue, acted as a 





A strictly economic perspective on the adoption of the single currency in the NMSs falls 
short in explaining the widely diverse strategies that these countries embraced. A 
political economy standpoint, with its emphasis on the features of the internal 
institutional players and the expected behavior of national and supranational political 
actors, is in a better position to offer a more realistic view on this ultimately monetary 
phenomenon. In addition, the view that stresses internal politics factors is well suited to 
help complete the picture on the political conditions necessary for the (quintessentially 
political) decision to renounce an economic policy tool and to switch to an externally 
issued currency. 
 
We have analyzed a number of economic and political factors that could aid explain the 
sluggish advancement towards euro adoption in Romania (a synthesis of our findings is 
provided in Table 3). Even with the economic factors improving – the economic 
structure, trade relations, labor market flexibility, and business cycle synchronization 
have all moved towards greater compatibility with the euro area core – the political 
economy factors have not been particularly favorable to early euro adoption. On the one 
hand, the real convergence of the Romanian economy has shown slow but steady 
progress and the public is not particularly attached to the national currency. On the 
other, however, there are no identifiable forces pushing hard for euro adoption. 
Although Romania has been the recipient of increasing foreign investment in industries 
well integrated with the rest of the EU’s economy, pressures from interest groups that 
were supposed to gain from monetary unification were almost nonexistent. Finally, in 
spite of a euro-enthusiast internal public, the factors that relate to the domestic political 
life have not played effectively in favor of euro adoption. Even though political leaders 
from across the political spectrum have routinely declared their support for adopting 
the euro, concrete steps in this direction were at best timid. The latest target date for 
adoption that the ruling party assumed is endangered by the unfavorable economic 
context of the last year brought about by unsustainable fiscal policies. Once again, 
representatives of the BNR seem to favor a more prudent approach and delay the 
adoption date. 
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Table 3. Summary of economic and political factors for euro adoption in Romania 
(authors’ own compilation) 
Factor Specifics 
Economic factors 
Economic structure and 
trade relation 
Improvement of the current and capital accounts; high 




Rapidly increasing since 2008 
Political economy factors 
Nominal convergence Maastricht criteria met only in 2015, 2016 and 2017 
Real convergence A slow advancing real convergence 
Exchange rate regime Managed float; a relatively stable real exchange rate 
Interest-group pressure Weak pressure for adoption 
The symbolic factor Not a deterrent for euro adoption 
Internal politics factors 
Presidency 
Highly supportive; lack of economic responsibilities; no 
veto power 
The priority of 
consecutive 
governments 
Euro has been presented as a priority; lack of concrete 
steps towards euro adoption 





Goal, instrument and financial independence; members of 
the board politically appointed 
Government vs. central 
bank 
Political cooperation until 2016; more conflict since 2016; 
BNR has had a cautious approach to euro adoption 
Public opinion Highly supportive; slightly declining with the euro crisis 
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ECB – European Central Bank 
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